Endogenous Exchange Rate Pass-through when Nominal Prices are Set in Advance by Michael B. Devereux et al.
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK DISCUSSION PAPERS
ÚJ SOROZAT NEW  SERIES
MT–DP. 2003/4
ENDOGENOUS EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH
WHEN NOMINAL PRICES ARE SET IN ADVANCE
MICHAEL B. DEVEREUX –
CHARLES ENGEL –
 PETER E. STORGAARD
Institute of Economics
 Hungarian Academy of Sciences
BudapestMŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK DISCUSSION PAPERS
NEW SERIES 2003/4
ENDOGENOUS EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH
WHEN NOMINAL PRICES ARE SET IN ADVANCE
MICHAEL B. DEVEREUX –
CHARLES ENGEL –
 PETER E. STORGAARD
  Budapest
May 2003KTK/IE Discussion Papers 2003/4
Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences
KTK/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque
comments. Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper
is preliminary. Materials published in this series may subject to further
publication.
Endogenous Exchange Rate Pass-through when Nominal Prices are
Set in Advance
Authors: Michael B. DEVEREUX (University of British Columbia and CEPR)
Charles ENGEL (University of Wisconsin and NBER)
Peter E. STORGAARD (Danmarks Nationalbank)
This paper is a combination and comprehensive revision of Devereux and Engel
(2001), and Storgaard (2001). We thank Philippe Bacchetta, Paul Beaudry, Paul
Bergin, Menzie Chinn, Linda Goldberg, Luisa Lambertini, Aaron Tornell, Eric
van Wincoop, Carlos Vegh, Jaume Ventura, and participants of seminars at the
New York Federal Reserve Bank, University of British Columbia, University of
Santa Cruz, and University of California at Los Angeles, and two referees for
comments. We thank Shiu-Sheng Chen and Akito Matsumoto for excellent
research assistance. The views expressed are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of Danmarks Nationalbank.
Engel acknowledges support from the NSF through a grant to University of
Wisconsin.
Published by the Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 2002.ENDOGENOUS EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH
WHEN NOMINAL PRICES ARE SET IN ADVANCE
BY M.B. DEVEREUX, CH. ENGEL AND P.E. STORGAARD
Abstract
This paper develops a model of endogenous exchange rate pass-through
within an open economy macroeconomic framework, where both pass-
through and the exchange rate are simultaneously determined, and
interact with one another. Pass-through is endogenous because firms
choose the currency in which they set their export prices. There is a unique
equilibrium rate of pass-through under the condition that exchange rate
volatility rises as the degree of pass-through falls. We show that the
relationship between exchange rate volatility and economic structure may
be substantially affected by the presence of endogenous pass-through. Our
key results show that pass-through is related to the relative stability of
monetary policy. Countries with relatively low volatility of money growth
will have relatively low rates of exchange rate pass-through, while
countries with relatively high volatility of money growth will have
relatively high pass-through rates.
 M.B. DEVEREUX – CH. ENGEL – P.E. STORGAARD
ENDOGÉN ÁRFOLYAM-BEGYŰRŰZÉS ELŐRE
MEGHATÁROZOTT NOMINÁLIS ÁRAK ESETÉN
Összefoglaló
A tanulmány egy nyitott-gazdasági makroökonómiai keretben írja fel az
endogén árfolyam-begyűrűzés (pass-through) olyan modelljét, ahol az ár-
folyam-begyűrűzés mértéke és az árfolyam kölcsönösen hatással vannak
egymásra és egyidejűleg határozódnak meg. A begyűrűzés azért lesz endo-
gén, mert a vállalatok megválaszthatják, hogy az exportpiacra készült ter-
mékeik árát melyik devizában határozzák meg. Abban az esetben, ha az
árfolyam volatilitása az árfolyam-begyűrűzés mértékével együtt növekszik,
a begyűrűzés mértékének egyetlen  egyensúlyi értéke létezik. Megmutatjuk,
hogy az endogén árfolyam-begyűrűzés esetében jelentősen megváltozhat
az árfolyam volatilitása és a gazdasági szerkezet közötti kapcsolat.. Az
egyik alapvető eredmény értelmében a begyűrűzés mértéke a különböző
országok monetáris politikájának relatív stabilitásától függ. Amennyiben
az egyik országban alacsony a pénzmennyiség növekedési ütemének
volatilitása, ott alacsony lesz az árfolyam-begyűrűzés mértéke, míg a ma-
gas volatilitás  ehhez képest erőteljes begyűrűzéssel jár együtt. 
 
Introduction 
A large body of empirical evidence has found that pass-through of exchange rate changes to 
import prices is less than complete.
1  However, the degree of pass-through is not uniform across countries 
or industries.
2  Exchange rate pass-through matters for many questions; for instance the predicted 
volatility of the real exchange rate, the international transmission of macroeconomic shocks, and the 
welfare benefits of international policy coordination.
3  It is therefore important to understand the 
underlying determinants of pass-through.  While there is a large literature that has examined long-run 
pass-through – the optimal pricing choice of firms when markets are segmented and competition is 
imperfect – considerably less study has been undertaken of pass-through in the short run when there may 
be some nominal price stickiness.    
We analyze the determinants of an exporting firm’s choice of currency in which to pre-set prices.  
With nominal price stickiness, the aggregate degree of exchange rate pass-through is determined by this 
decision.  The paper therefore develops a model of endogenous exchange rate pass-through, in a 
framework  in which the exchange rate itself is endogenously determined.  We find that there is a two-
way interaction between exchange rate pass-through and exchange rate volatility.  Exchange rate 
volatility determines the price-setting choices of a firm, and therefore the degree of aggregate exchange 
rate pass-through.  But in turn, the degree of exchange rate pass-through itself determines the volatility of 
the exchange rate.   
The starting point of our analysis is the assumption that prices are sticky in the short run. There is 
a long tradition of nominal price stickiness in models of macroeconomics. But in an open economy, the 
question of price stickiness is more problematic.  Clearly, the exchange rate is not sticky.  As a result, 
when a good is traded between countries with flexible exchange rates, the currency in which the price of 
the good is fixed becomes an important factor in determining the effect of exchange rate changes.  If 
                                                 
1 A short list of citations includes Krugman (1987), Knetter (1989, 1993), Feenstra (1989), Feenstra, Gagnon, and 
Knetter (1996), Goldberg and Knetter (1997), Goldberg (1995), and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) for studies of 
pass-through to import prices.  Engel (1993), Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (2001), among many 
others, have studied pass-through to consumer prices. 
2  This point was emphasized in the survey of Goldberg and Knetter (1997).  2 
 
prices are sticky in the currency of the exporter (we denote this as PCP, or ‘producer currency pricing’), 
then pass-through from exchange rate changes to final consumers will be complete, and imported goods 
will display considerable price flexibility.  On the other hand, if goods prices are fixed in consumer’s 
currency (LCP, or ‘local currency pricing’), there is no pass-through at all, and imported goods prices are 
unaffected by exchange rate changes.   
When a firm sells abroad, would it prefer to follow PCP or LCP?  This question has been 
addressed before, but mostly in partial equilibrium settings, which take as exogenous key variables that 
are influenced by the price-setting configuration itself.  For instance, in general equilibrium, the behavior 
of exchange rates, labor costs, and demand may themselves depend on how prices are set.  
Our analysis proceeds in three stages.  In the first stage, we examine the choice of currency of 
price setting for a firm that has local market power in a stochastic environment, taking as given the 
distribution of exchanges rates, market demand, and prices of other firms.  We establish a very simple 
rule for the choice of price-setting currency.  If a firm is choosing its prices optimally, then up to a second 
order approximation, its decision depends only on the variance of the exchange rate and the covariance of 
the exchange rate with marginal costs.  The higher is the variance of the exchange rate, the more incentive 
the firm has to set prices in its own currency.  The higher is the covariance of the exchange rate and 
marginal costs, the more the firm would wish to set its price in foreign currency.  A remarkable aspect of 
the result is that the currency of pricing decision is independent of the variance of market demand and the 
prices of all other firms.   
We then place the firm in a two-country intertemporal general equilibrium environment where the 
exchange rate and marginal costs are determined by random money shocks. Each country has a 
continuum of firms that export goods to the other country.  The degree of exchange rate pass-through is 
determined by the measure of firms that choose to follow PCP.  While firms’ decisions with respect to 
currency of pricing depend on the distribution of exchange rates and marginal costs, these distributions in 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 See for example, Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000), Devereux and Engel (2000), Tille (2000), and Lane (2001).   3 
 
turn depend on the degree of aggregate exchange rate pass-through. There is a two way inter-relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and exchange rate pass-through.    
Is there a unique equilibrium degree of exchange rate pass-through?  If pass-through depends on 
exchange rate volatility, and exchange rate volatility depends on pass-through, there arises the possibility 
of multiple equilibria.
4  Roughly speaking, the condition for a unique equilibrium is that exchange rate 
volatility is higher in an economy where exchange rate pass-through is lower.  On the other hand, if 
declining pass-through is associated with a decline in exchange rate volatility, then multiple equilibria 
may exist.  We show that in our model, multiple equilibria are unlikely to occur.  
The overall degree of exchange rate pass-through depends on various structural features of the 
economy.  Pass-through is higher the more stable are marginal costs in each country, and the lower is the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.  Moreover, in an environment of 
endogenous exchange rate pass-through, conventional results on the determinants of exchange rate 
volatility must be applied with caution.  In particular, our model of exchange rate determination implies 
that low exchange rate pass-through can produce substantial exchange rate volatility.  But when pass-
through is endogenous, the presence of high exchange rate volatility will itself increase the incentive for 
firms to follow PCP.  By increasing the rate of aggregate pass-through, this dampens exchange rate 
volatility.   
In the third stage of our analysis, we examine the relationship between monetary policy and pass-
through. Our key results relate to the impact of differential monetary shocks on the degree of exchange 
pass-through.  When countries have differences in the volatility of money growth, our model predicts that 
exporting firms in both countries will tend to pre-set their prices in the country that has the more stable 
money growth.  This leads to an important link between monetary policy and price stability.  A country 
that follows a successful policy of monetary stabilization, reducing the variance of its money growth, will 
experience a price-stability ‘bonus’.  This is because foreign exporters will begin more and more to set 
                                                 
4 This was pointed out by Devereux and Engel (2001).  A slightly different perspective on multiple equilibria in the 
decision over invoicing currency is presented by Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2002).  We discuss Bacchetta and 
Van Wincoop (2002) more fully below.   4 
 
their prices in that country’s currency, thereby reducing the impact of exchange rate changes on the 
country’s CPI.  But the flip side of this is that the foreign country experiences less stable prices, since 
exporters in the stabilizing country will also begin to pre-set their prices in domestic currency.  Thus, 
there is a ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ aspect to policies of monetary stabilization in an environment of 
endogenous pass-through. 
This paper is part of a wider literature on sticky price open economy macroeconomic models.
5  
Recently, several studies have looked at the determination of the degree of exchange rate pass-through in 
general equilibrium models with endogenous exchange rates.  Devereux and Engel (2001) and Storgaard 
(2001) present a very similar analysis of the decision with respect to PCP versus LCP, in separate works 
that have been combined to form the present paper.  Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2001) present 
numerical results on equilibrium pass-through in a static environment.  They find a positive connection 
between risk-aversion and local currency pricing.  In some cases they find that there are no pure strategy 
equilibria for firms’ pricing decisions, a theme we take up below.  Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2002) 
focus on the choice of invoicing currency (or currency of price setting) in a static general equilibrium 
framework, providing analytical results.  Their partial equilibrium results take on much of the flavor of 
theoretical conclusions of Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter’s (1996) – that pass-through is greater when 
exporting firms have a high degree of market power.  They emphasize the possibility of multiple 
equilibria that arise because of strategic complementarities between the price-setting decisions of firms.  
They also explore the role of multiple countries, and the impact of a monetary union on the equilibrium 
invoicing currency in international trade. In their paper, multiple equilibria arise due to diminishing 
returns to scale in a manner that is absent in our work.  But they do not focus on the two-way interaction 
between exchange rate pass-through and exchange rate volatility, nor do they examine the implication of 
differences in monetary policies across countries.  
The next section sets out the problem of a single firm in a stochastic environment, and establishes 
a simple rule for the determination of the currency of pricing.  Section 2 sets out the general equilibrium  5 
 
model.  Section 3 combines section 1 and section 2 to determine the degree of exchange rate pass-
through.  Section 4 explores the implications of differences in the variance of money growth among 
countries.  
 
Section 1.  The Decision of a Firm in a Stochastic Environment          
In this section, we examine the choice of currency of price setting for a monopolistic exporting 
firm in a partial equilibrium setting.  We develop a condition on variables (exchange rates and wages) that 
are exogenous to the firm, under which the firm will choose to price in its own currency or the currency 
of the importing country.  In the next section, we explore the properties of a specific macroeconomic 
model.  Embedded in that model are firms that face precisely the same type of demand curve and cost 
function as does the firm in this section. 
Take a firm i in the home country selling a differentiated good to a foreign market. Assume that 
the firm faces the CES demand curve  
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    (1.1) 
() P i is the price the foreign consumer pays for good i. P is the price index for all home goods purchased 
by the foreign consumer, and 
* P is the foreign country consumer price index.  Without loss of generality 
let  () , , P iP and 
* P  be denominated in foreign currency.  
* Y is a demand shift variable that is 
independent of price. λ  is the price elasticity of demand facing the domestic firm i .  θ  is the foreign 
price elasticity of demand for domestic goods.  Firm i is a small enough supplier that it ignores the impact 
of its pricing decision on P.   
  Equation (1.1) imposes a particular functional form on the firm’s demand schedule so as to be 
consistent with the general equilibrium model developed below.  But we make no specific assumptions 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998, 2000), Lane (2001), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2000), Devereux and 
Engel (2001), and many others.   6 
 
about the distribution of 
* , P P , and 
* Y .  These variables may be stochastic, and may be correlated with 
the exchange rate.   
  The firm has a constant returns to scale production function, and faces the (possibly stochastic) 
marginal cost W . The firm evaluates profits using the (stochastic) discount factor d .  In the model 
below, we determine the exact form of d.  
PCP versus LCP 
  The firm has to decide whether to set its price in domestic or foreign currency.  Whatever 
currency it chooses, it must set the price before the state of the world is known.   
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,   (1.2) 
whereS  is the exchange rate (domestic-currency price of foreign currency).  
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  We shall see in Proposition 1 (below) that the optimal currency of price setting does not depend 
on the characteristics of the discount factor, d.  The only restriction we impose is that the discount factor 
is exogenous to the firm. In the macroeconomic model we present below, the discount factor is specified 
so that firms are maximizing the expected utility of firm owners.  Nominal profits are deflated by the 
exact consumption price index of the representative firm owner, and weighted by the marginal utility of 
consumption of firm owners.  However, our results (Proposition 1) are more general and hold irrespective 
of how firm managers evaluate the marginal value of future nominal income to firm owners.   
  The profit-maximizing price for the firm, under PCP and LCP, respectively, may easily be 
derived as follows: 
() ( )
() , ()
1( ) 1 ()
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Pi Pi
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where
** Z dP P Y
λθ θ − = .  
Using these solutions, the expressions for expected discounted profits are:   
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 . From expressions (1.4) and (1.5), we may establish: 
Proposition 1  
The home firm sets its price for the foreign market in home (foreign) currency if  
   
var( )
cov( , ) 0, ( 0)
2
s
ws  −> <  
,  
where  ln( ) s S = , and  ln( ) wW = . Proof: see appendix A. 
  This condition says that (log) exchange rate variance leads the firm to set its price in terms of 
home currency.  But a positive covariance between (the log of) the exchange rate and (the log of) 
marginal costs leads the firm to set its price in foreign currency.  To explain this condition, take 
expressions (1.2) and (1.3) again.  In any given state of the world, under either pricing policy, profits are 
increasing in the exchange rate. Under PCP, a rise in the exchange rate will increase demand for the 
firm’s good, holding other firms’ prices constant.  Under LCP, a rise in the exchange rate will increase the 
home currency value of sales.  But under PCP, the profit function in any state of the world is strictly 
convex in the exchange rate, for 1 λ > , while with LCP the profit function is linear in the exchange rate.  
This means that, holding other variables constant, an increase in exchange rate variance increases profits 
under PCP relative to LCP.   If this were the only consideration, the firm would follow PCP if there were 
any exchange rate uncertainty.  
  But there is a secondary channel, arising from the uncertainty of marginal costs.  If the covariance 
between the exchange rate and marginal cost is positive, this tends to increase expected total costs under  8 
 
PCP, since the firm’s demand is higher precisely when the cost of production is higher.
6  Under LCP 
however, demand is independent of the exchange rate (holding other variables constant), so that expected 
total costs do not depend on the covariance between the exchange rate and marginal cost.  This channel 
therefore increases the incentive to choose LCP.  
When we add both of these channels together, we arrive at exactly the condition described in the 
proposition. Note a striking feature of Proposition 1.  The condition does not depend on the variance of 
Z  (which itself depends on total demand, the prices of other home firms, the foreign CPI, and the 
stochastic discount factor), or the covariance of Z with S or W .  It follows that Proposition 1 holds in 
any environment in which the firm’s demand schedule can be described by (1.1).  In particular, it will 
apply in the same form for the general equilibrium model that we construct below.  Thus, given 
var( ) s and cov( , ) ws , the firm’s optimal currency of pricing is independent of the pricing policies of 
other firms, the assumptions about international financial markets, or the characteristics of any other 
macro variables in the domestic or foreign economies.  
    Why does the condition in proposition 1 not depend on the distribution of Z ? Rewrite (1.2) and 
(1.3) as: 
) ( 1Z X E E











W i P X
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) ) ( ( 1    (1.6) 
) ( 2Z X E E
LCP = Π , where  ()
λ −
− = ) ( ) ) ( ( 2 i P W i SP X
LCP LCP . (1.7) 
An increase in S increases both  1 X  and  2 X , so in both the PCP and LCP cases, expected profits are 
higher when the covariance of S and Z is positive.
7 In the PCP case, when there is a depreciation, profits 
increase because demand for the good increases.  In the LCP case, as S rises, profits increase because the 
                                                 
6  There is a link between the conditions for pricing in consumer’s currency and the conditions for low pass-through 
when prices are set ex post.  We have noted the similarity between the conditions in Bachetta and van Wincoop’s 
(2002) model, and Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter’s (1996) model of pricing to market.  Friberg (1998) draws a link 
between Giovannini’s (1988) model of choice of currency for setting prices and models of pricing to market such as 
Krugman’s (1987).  Here we note that the pricing to market literature – especially the empirical literature – has 
drawn the link between correlation of wages with exchange rates, and the response of import prices to exchange rate 
changes.  See Goldberg and Knetter (1997, p. 1251) for a discussion.  9 
 
profit margin on each unit rises.  Intuitively, the reason why the comovements of S and Z have 
approximately no effect on the comparison of expected profits in the LCP and PCP cases is that a small 
deviation in S (around the point of approximation) has equal effects on  1 X  and  2 X .  That can be 
understood by recognizing that under certainty, firms increase prices until the point where the increase in 
total revenue from raising the price on each unit is equal to the loss in revenue from the lost demand as 
price increases.
8  
  The situation of a foreign firm exporting to the domestic market is entirely analogous, so long as 
demand can be described as in equation (1).  Thus we may state: 
Corollary to Proposition 1. 
 The foreign firm sets its price for the home market in foreign (home) currency if  
    
* var( )
cov( , ) 0, ( 0)
2
s
ws  +> <  
. 
 
Section 2. The General Equilibrium Model 
While the last section examines the decision on currency of pricing taking as given the 
distribution of the exchange rate, in this section we construct a general equilibrium model of exchange 
rate determination, taking as given the currency of pricing followed by firms.  The model is taken entirely 
from the recent literature on monopolistic competition in (open economy) macroeconomics (e.g. 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987, Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995), so our description is kept brief. (The full 
details of the model are given in the Mathematical Appendix.  There are two countries, home and foreign, 
                                                                                                                                                             
7   It is clear from inspection of (1.6) and (1.7) that the mean and variance of Z and the covariance of Z with W affect 
expected profits equally in the PCP and LCP cases. 
8 How does the condition of proposition 1 relate to the partial equilibrium models of Giovannini (1988) (see also 
Friberg (1998))?   In Giovannini (1988), it is assumed that the exchange rate is the only source of uncertainty in the 
firm’s pricing problem.  He then shows that if profits under PCP are concave (convex) in the exchange rate, then 
LCP (PCP) is preferred to PCP (LCP) by the firm.  Profits are concave (convex) in the exchange rate if the market 
demand curve is concave (convex).  In our analysis, holding marginal cost constant, profits must be convex in the 
exchange rate, because we use a CES demand system in which the demand schedule is convex by construction.  
Therefore, were the exchange rate the only source of uncertainty, all firms would wish to follow PCP (as we have 
shown).   But our interest is in analyzing the two-way interaction between exchange rate pass-through and exchange 
rate determination.  Since the exchange rate and marginal costs are both driven by the underlying aggregate shocks 
to the economy, we cannot assume that marginal costs are constant.  Hence the condition underlying proposition 1.     10 
 
with consumers, firms and governments in each country.  There are n households and firms in the home 
country, and 1-n in the foreign country.  All firms have a monopoly over sales of their good, and all 
workers (households) have a monopoly in setting their wage.   
Preferences and Market Structure 
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,  0 > ρ . 
C(k) is a consumption index, () M k
P  are domestic real balances, and L(k) is the labor supply of the 
representative home agent.  Consumption is decomposed into the consumption of home and foreign 
composites, with elasticity of substitution θ  between composites.  In turn, the home (foreign) composite is 
defined over a continuum of n (1-n) goods, with elasticity λ  between individual goods. 
The consumer price index may be written as ()
1
11 1 (1 ) th t f t Pn P n P
θθ θ −− − =+ − , where  it P  represents 
the price index of country i’s goods for sale in the home country.  Prices set in foreign currency are 
denoted with an asterisk.   Prices for each period are set before all information about the period is known.  
All goods sold by local firms are priced in local currency, but when exporting, firms can follow PCP or 
LCP.  Let the fraction of home (foreign) firms that engage in LCP be z (
* z ).  For now we take these 
values as given.  




1 (1 )(1 ) 1 *1 1
(1 )(1 )
11
(( ) ) ( )
11
nzn
ft t fht fht nn z n P SP i d i P i d i
nn
λ λλ − +− − −−
+− −
 =+  −−   ,  
                                                                                                                                                             
  11 
 
where the notation  () fht P i and 
* () fht P i represents the domestic-currency and foreign-currency price of 
foreign goods sold in the home market.      Holding goods prices fixed, the pass-through from exchange 
rate changes to home prices depends on the number of foreign firms following LCP.  As 
* 1 z → , pass-
through is zero. 
Home households’ expenditure consists of consumption and the accumulation of money balances 
and bonds.  Their revenues come from wage income, the earnings of profits from home country firms, 
payment on pre-existing bonds, money balances carried over, and transfers from the monetary authority.  
They choose consumption, their wage rate (given their individual monopoly power over their 
differentiated labor), bonds and money balances to maximize utility.   We make the assumption that 
international financial markets are imperfect.  Consumers can trade abroad only in non-contingent 
nominal bonds.  Thus, there is incomplete international risk sharing. Within the domestic economy 
however, we assume that there is full risk sharing across households.  This eliminates the specific 
uncertainty in wage income across types of households.  Because utility is additively separable between 
consumption and labor, this implies that households will have equal consumption, whether or not they 
adjust wages ex-post.  
  Firms produce using labor only, with constant returns to scale. Since we wish to allow for some 
stickiness in wages, we follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) in assuming that production uses 
differentiated labor, with elasticity of demand ω  between types of labor.  To maintain symmetry in the 
model, assume that any individual firm uses workers of each type.  Therefore, the production function for 
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  .  Each worker then faces a specific labor demand curve with wage  12 
 
elasticity of demand ω . The firm will choose its price to maximize the state-contingent value of profits.  
Since firms are owned by domestic households, they evaluate profits at the same state-contingent prices 
that are used for trading between domestic agents. 
Equilibrium Conditions 
Table 1 outlines the main equations of the model.  Table 1a describes the optimality conditions 
for the consumer and the firm.  The consumer chooses a stock of domestic currency denominated bonds 
to maximize utility, given the nominal interest rate  1 t r+
9.   Money demand depends positively on 
consumption and negatively on the nominal interest rate.  Each consumer-worker sets the wage as a 
markup over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.  A fraction v of the total 
n workers set wages ex-post, after the state of the world is realized, while the fraction 1-v set wages in 













− = .  Wage and price indices are described in Table 1b.   
Table 1c describes the market clearing relationships.  Employment of fixed wage and flexible-
wage workers will in general differ (although the income effects of this are diversified away).  The home 
country current account (per capita) is equal to total income per capita less consumption.   1 t B +  represents 
the home country’s stock of net foreign assets (denominated in the home currency). All home consumers 
receive the same income, where income comes from sales to domestic consumers and sales to foreign 
consumers, through both PCP and LCP firms.  
Model Solution 
Let the money stock in each country follow a random walk in logs
10. For the home country: 
11 1 ln ln ( ) 0 tt t t t MM uE u ++ + =+ = 
                                                 
9 We omit the presentation of the conditions over the choice of within-country state-contingent assets, because from 
the Mathematical Appendix we know this just leads to full consumption insurance across agents within a country. 
10 We take the monetary policy shocks as exogenous.  But since we allow for arbitrary covariance between home 
and foreign money shocks, our framework in principle allows for any exchange rate outcome, ranging from free 
floats (when shocks are independent), to a pegged exchange rate (when shocks are collinear).   13 
 
          We may solve by linear approximation around an initial non-stochastic equilibrium.  The full linear 
approximation is derived in Appendix B. In order to determine the currency in which firms set their 
prices, the only information we need is the second moment properties of the log of the exchange rate and 
wages. But this is exactly what is obtained from the linear approximation.  Let 
1 ln ln tj tj t tj x XEX ++ − + =−  represent the log deviation from time t-1 expectation for any variable tj X + , 
0 j ≥ .  A very convenient property of the money demand specification, in combination with the 
assumption about the money supply process, is that the nominal interest rate is constant.  This is because, 
given that the log of the money stock follows a random walk, so does the log of the term tt PC
ρ .   Using 
this fact, taking the money market equilibrium for the home country from Table 1a, and the analogous 
conditions for the foreign country, linearizing, and taking differences, gives 
*
* (1 *(1 )) tt t
tt




−= − .       (2.1) 
When there is full pass-through of exchange rates into prices, i.e.  *0 zz == , purchasing power parity 
holds at all times, and (2.1) represents a simple ‘monetary model’ of the exchange rate.  Alternatively, 
with  *1 z z == , shocks to relative consumption are determined by shocks to relative money supplies 
alone.  
 From  time  t+1 onwards, in expectation, there is full money neutrality (in the linear approximate 
model).  Then, using the time t+1 balance of payments condition, labor market and product market 












,                   (2.2) 
where  () (1 )
(1 )










− ), and PC  
describes the initial steady state value of nominal consumption.    This condition says that, if the home  14 
 
country is expected to have an increase in net foreign assets, beginning in time t+1, then it is also 
expected to have an increase in its relative consumption
11.   
   Using the balance of payments condition for time t, the expressions for foreign and domestic 
sales, and the price indices from Table 1b, we obtain the following 
[]





cc z nz n n z n z s
nP C
θ
+ −+ = − − −− +− +
−
.   (2.3) 
  This equation says that shocks to the exchange rate, by affecting the relative income of the home 
and foreign country, affect the path of relative consumption and the current account.  Then, putting (2.2) 
and (2.3) together, we obtain 
[]
**
11 () ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 1 ) * ) ( 1 ) * tt t t t t cc E c c z nz n n z n z s
r
σ
θ ++ −+ − = − − −− +− + . (2.4) 
  Equation (2.4) says that the income effects of exchange rate changes are spread over current and 
expected future relative consumption.   
  Finally, from the home and foreign Euler equations (Table 1a), we may obtain the following 
condition relating consumption growth across the two countries (using  t t t s s E = + 1 ): 
**
11
(* ( 1 ) )
() tt t t t t
zn z n




−= − − .    (2.5)   
  Equation (2.5) says that an unanticipated exchange rate depreciation in period t, by causing a real 
exchange rate depreciation for the home country (when  ,* 0 zz ≠ ), reduces the relative home country 
interest rate, and causes a fall in expected consumption growth in the home country, relative to the foreign 
country.   
  We may put (2.1)-(2.5) together to obtain a solution for the impact of money shocks on the 
current exchange rate.  This is given by: 








  ,         (2.6)   
                                                 
11 Since our linear approximation is taken around an initial symmetric steady state with  0 B = , the net foreign  15 
 
where  () (1 ) *(1 ) ( 1) ( 1)(1 (1 ) * ) znz n z n zn
r
σ
ρρ θ  ∆= + + + − − + − − − −  
.   
The response of the exchange rate to unanticipated money shocks depends on the elasticity of 
demand for home goods, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, and the measure of LCP firms in the 
home and foreign countries.  Two special cases of (2.6), reported in Table 2 are of particular interest.  
With full pass-through from exchange rates to price (z=z*=0), the response of the exchange rate is lower, 
the greater is the elasticity of demand between home and foreign goods. On the other hand, when pass-
through is zero (z=z*=1), the exchange rate response is negatively related to ρ , the consumption 
elasticity of money demand.  
From Table 1 we also derive the response of marginal cost to a money shock as: 
()
a
tt t wv m l ψ =+ .     (2.7)   
The employment response to a money shock is: 
* (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 * (1 ))
aa
tt t t t lv w n c n c n n z z n s ωθ = − − + +− +− − − − . (2.8) 
Employment depends negatively upon the wage of the flexible wage setters, positively on the movement 
in aggregate world consumption, and, through ‘expenditure switching’ effects, positively on the nominal 
exchange rate, so long as there is some pass-through of exchange rates into prices (i.e. when  ,* 1 zz < ).   
From the money market equilibrium conditions in Table 1a, the movement in world consumption 
is: 
      
**








+− = .                (2.9) 
An unanticipated increase in home or foreign money raises world consumption.  But in addition, 
when
* z z ≠ , an exchange rate depreciation has a compositional impact on total consumption.  For 
instance, when z>z*, a depreciation raises the home CPI more than it reduces the foreign CPI.  Ceteris 
paribus, this implies that a weighted sum of home and foreign consumption will fall.    
                                                                                                                                                             
assets term enters in terms of rates of change, rather than proportional rates of change.  16 
 
  We now put the components of section 1 and section 2 together, examining the interaction 
between the determination of exchange rates and exchange rate pass-through.   
 
Section 3.  Equilibrium Pass-through with Identical Monetary Policies 
     We evaluate the conditions underlying proposition 1 and its corollary, using the results from (2.6), 




u u z z σ σ Φ  as the relative benefit to the firm of pricing 
by LCP as opposed to PCP.  That is: 
2
) ( var





2 * t t
t t t u u
s
s w z z
−
− − = Φ σ σ .  
Because exchange rate variance and the covariance of marginal cost and the exchange rate 
depend on the underlying monetary shocks, as well as on the measure of firms in each country following 




u u z z σ σ Φ  as: 
2
) ( var





2 * * t t
t t t u u
s
s w z z
−
− − − = Φ σ σ . 
Table 3 uses the results from section 2 to define the conditional variance of the exchange rate and the 
conditional covariance of exchange rate and marginal costs. We first focus on symmetric equilibria, 




u u σ σ = ,  * Φ=Φ , and  * z z = .  Countries are therefore identical in all respects, and 
firms in the home and foreign country follow the same pricing policy.  
           There are three candidate symmetric equilibria, described as follows: 
A) Symmetric PCP,  *0 zz == .  This requires 
22 (0,0, , ) 0, uu σσ Φ<                                            
B) Symmetric LCP,  *1 z z == .    This requires 
22 (1,1, , ) 0 uu σσ Φ> ,                                                                                      
C) Symmetric mixed, 0* 1 zz ≤= ≤ .   This requires 
22 (,, , ) 0 uu zzσσ Φ= .  17 
 
In the third case, at the equilibrium value of z, firms are indifferent between pricing in the home and 
foreign currency
12.    
To establish the existence of equilibrium we need to evaluate the Φ  function at each value of z.  
It is easy to establish that in the symmetric case: 
22 ( , , , ) ( ( 1) (1 ))(1 ) ( 1) (1 )(1 ) uu z zv z z v
rr
σσ
σσ ρ θ ψ θ ρ  Φ ∝ −+ + −+ − −+ −  
 ,   (3.1) 







 .   
Using expression (3.1), we may establish the following proposition  
Proposition 2: Symmetric equilibrium 





























, LCP is the unique equilibrium.  



























































 the unique equilibrium is  (0,1) z ∈ , such that 






























, there are three equilibria: PCP,  
                                                 
12 How would firms coordinate on a mixed equilibrium, when they are indifferent between the two policies? One 
possibility is that they play a mixed strategy, choosing to follow LCP (PCP) with probability z (1-z), before 
choosing prices (Bachetta and Van Wincoop 2001, give this interpretation).  An alternative possibility is that there 
are small differential firm-specific costs (e.g. menu costs) of choosing LCP as opposed to PCP. If we rank firms in  18 
 
LCP, and an interior (unstable) equilibrium  ˆ (0,1) z∈  such that 
22 ˆˆ (,, , ) 0 uu zzσσ Φ= .   
Proof:  The proposition follows directly from applying the parameter restrictions to the conditions for the 
different types of candidate equilibria given above. 
If the two inequalities given in part a hold, each firm has an incentive to set export prices in terms of 
the local currency, whatever other firms do.  Thus, the only equilibrium can be one where all firms follow 
LCP. For LCP to be a unique symmetric equilibrium, the consumption elasticity of money demand must 
be at least unity, and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods must be sufficiently 
high.  The results are sensitive to the flexibility in marginal cost.  If most wages are pre-set, then LCP 
cannot be an equilibrium.  But if v=1, so that all wages are adjusted ex-post, then LCP is the unique 
equilibrium when  1 ρ >  and  1 θ > .   
  If the two inequalities of part b hold, then each firm will follow PCP, no matter what other firms 
do.   This outcome is more likely, the lower is v, and the lower are θ  and ρ .  In the first case, the 
calculation the firm makes is dominated by the variance of the exchange rate, since the covariance of 
marginal costs and the exchange rate is small when most wages are pre-set.  In the second case, the lower 
are θ  and ρ , the higher is the volatility of the exchange rate, relative to the  1 cov ( , ) tt t ws −  term, 
whatever pricing policy is chosen.  As a result the optimal policy for all firms is to choose PCP.  
In part c, the incentives for pricing will depend on what other firms do. If all firms follow PCP, 
then any one firm would have an incentive to deviate and choose LCP.  But if all firms follow LCP, then 
again, any one firm would have an incentive to deviate and choose PCP.  Thus, there is no equilibrium 
where all firms follow the same pricing policy.  By continuity, an intermediate equilibrium exists in 
which some firms follow PCP and some firms LCP.   For a given value of v, this outcome is more likely, 
the higher is θ  and the lower is ρ .  In that case, exchange rate volatility is quite low under PCP, relative 
to  1 cov ( , ) tt t ws − , giving firms an incentive to engage in LCP.  But if all firms follow LCP, then with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
order of increasing costs, then the mixed equilibrium would be a limit outcome as the scale of these differential costs 
approaches zero.   19 
 
low value of ρ , exchange rate volatility is high, relative to  1 cov ( , ) tt t ws − .  This means that LCP is not 
an equilibrium.  In the intermediate equilibrium (1 ) z − firms follow PCP and z firms follow LCP.  No 
firm has an incentive to deviate from this outcome.  The key feature giving rise to a unique equilibrium is 
the presence of a negative relationship between pass-through and exchange rate volatility. 
  Part d is the opposite of part c.  In this case, all firms have an incentive to follow PCP if all other 
firms do also.  Conversely, all firms have an incentive to follow LCP if all other firms do also.  For a 
given value of v, this outcome is more likely, the lower is θ  and the higher is ρ .  Exchange rate 
volatility is then quite high under PCP, relative to  1 cov ( , ) tt t ws − , giving firms and incentive to engage in 
PCP, when all other firms do so.  But if all firms follow LCP, then with a high value of ρ , exchange rate 
volatility is low.  This encourages firms to engage in LCP when other firms also follow LCP.  Thus, both 
z=0 and z=1 are equilibria.
13 A positive relationship between exchange rate pass-through and exchange 
rate volatility thus gives rise to the possibility of non-uniqueness. 
  Can there be pure strategy asymmetric equilibria in the symmetric model?  No.  In the symmetric 
model,  ) , cov( s w  and  ) *, cov( s w −  differ only in the  * z z −  term that appears in each expression in 
Table 3.  If  * z z > , then  ) *, cov( ) , cov( s w s w − <  implying that  * Φ < Φ .  The latter inequality cannot 
be consistent with home firms choosing LCP ( 0 > Φ ) and foreign firms choosing PCP ( 0 *< Φ ). Hence, 
assuming  * z z >  leads to a contradiction.    
  Figure 1 describes the four possible equilibrium configurations, in terms of the value of 
the
22 (,, , ) uu zzσσ Φ function over the range of z.  Figure 1a describes the unique LCP outcome.  Figure 1b 
shows the unique PCP outcome. In each case the equilibrium is unique because the gain to following LCP 
is positive (negative) irrespective of the choice of other firms. Figure 1c shows the unique intermediate 
outcome, while Figure 1d illustrates the possibility of multiple equilibria.   
                                                 
13 There is also an internal equilibrium.  This equilibrium is unstable, however, since if a small measure of firms 
deviate by increasing (decreasing) z, then all others will wish to follow, so that z goes to 1 (0).     20 
 
We note from the figures that multiple equilibria are possible only when the 
22 (,, , ) uu zzσσ Φ  
function is upward sloping.  The slope of the function is (positively) proportional to  
(1 ) ( 1 ) 1 v
r
σ
ρ θ ψ θ ρ  −− + + + −  
     (3.2) 
As suggested by the proposition, this is more likely to be positive, the higher is ρ , and the lower is θ .  
More informally, multiple equilibria are more likely when LCP tends to be associated with low exchange 
rate volatility, and PCP tends to be associated with high exchange rate volatility.   Empirically, however, 
multiple equilibria are not very likely in our model.  The empirically relevant range of θ  exceeds unity, 
and should certainly exceed the consumption elasticity of money demand ρ .   
Note that Proposition 2 does not depend on distribution of the money supplies.  With identical 
monetary variances, both the variance of the exchange rate and the covariance of exchange rates and 
marginal costs are affected equally by monetary variability.    
In case c), the equilibriumz is given by 
 
(1 )
(1 ) ( 1 ) ( )











−+ + + −

 .                                      (3.3) 
Inspection of (3.3) indicates that z is increasing in v .  As a greater fraction of wages are set ex-post, the 
equilibrium degree of pass-through declines.  Similarly,  z is increasing in ρ  and θ . Both parameters 
tend to reduce exchange rate volatility for any given z, increasing the number of firms who engage in 
LCP.    
This case illustrates an important implication of Proposition 2; the relationship between exchange 
rate volatility and economic structure may be substantially altered by the endogeneity of exchange rate 
pass-through.  To illustrate, take a special case where 0 ψ = and  1 v =  .  With pass-through taken as given, 
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If we begin in a situation where  1, 1 θ ρ >>, so that  1 z =  holds (part a of the proposition), then all firms 




























.  Here, exchange 




uu u u σ σ σ − + .  Now let ρ  fall 
below unity.  Ignoring the response of pass-through, we would predict that this would increase exchange 
rate volatility, so that volatility exceeded the variance of monetary fundamentals. But in our model, this 
will not happen.  When ρ  falls below unity, part c of the proposition (or Figure 1c) applies.  Now we have 









.   Exchange rate volatility is now given by 




uu u u σ σ σ − + . In this example, when endogenous pass-through is taken into account, exchange 
rate volatility will never exceed the monetary fundamentals.  
Section 4.  Pass-through with Differential Monetary Policies 
We now allow for differences in money growth volatility across countries. To focus on the effects 
of different volatilities, we assume in this section that the money shocks are uncorrelated across countries.  
Without loss of generality, assume that the home country has lower monetary growth volatility than the 
foreign country.  As discussed in footnote 9, we may think of equilibria where firms employ mixed 
strategies.  Thus, if  0 ) , , , (
2
*
2 * = Φ u u z z σ σ  and  0 ) , , , (
2
*
2 * * = Φ u u z z σ σ  we say { ,* z z } is an 
equilibrium where each home (foreign) firm chooses a probability z (z*), ex ante, of setting its export 
price in foreign (home) currency, and 1-z, (1-z*) of setting its price in home (foreign) currency.   
To simplify the presentation of results, we first make the additional assumption that preferences 
display linearity in labor supply, so that  0 ψ = .  This assumption is commonly used in the literature on  22 
 
exchange rates and price stickiness (Devereux and Engel 2001, Corsetti and Pesenti 2001).  Qualitatively, 
none of the results are affected by the assumption.  The general case where  0 ψ > is used in the 
simulations below.  In addition, further to our discussion of the last section, we focus only on the cases of 
unique equilibrium.  Thus, we restrict attention to the set of equilibria where the Φ  and
* Φ functions are 
downward sloping.
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* * * n z n z n z zn
r
v z z θ ρ ρ
σ
.  Note that from our 
assumption that 
22
* uu σσ > , we have 
* Ω>Ω .  The equilibrium is described by the set 
* {, } z z µ = .  The 
equilibrium has the following properties: 
a) If  Ω > + = Γ ) ( ~ ) 1 , 1 ( ρ
σ
r
v , then  {1,1} µ = .   
b) If    Ω = − − − + − + − + + = Γ )) ˆ 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( ˆ 1 ( 1 ( ~ ) 1 , ˆ ( z n n z n
r
v z θ ρ ρ
σ
 and  ˆ 01 z << , then 
ˆ {, 1 } z µ = .  
c) If    Ω < − − + − − + + = Γ < Ω )) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ( ~ ) 1 , 0 (
* n n
r
v θ ρ ρ
σ
, then  {0,1} µ = .  
                                                 
14 In the specific case where  0 ψ = , this requires that  (1 ) ( 1) (1 )0 nn ρ θ ρ −− − −>  and  23 
 
d) If    )) ˆ 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ˆ 1 ( ~ ) ˆ , 0 (
* * * * z n n z
r
v z − − + − − + + = Γ = Ω θ ρ ρ
σ
 and 
* ˆ 01 z << , then 
* ˆ {0, } z µ = . 
e) If   
* )) 1 ( 1 ( ~ ) 0 , 0 ( Ω < − + + = Γ θ ρ
σ
r
v , then  {0,0} µ = .  
Proof:  For each part, the proof follows by direct construction.  In case a), if  (1,1) Γ  exceeds Ω , then full 
LCP is an equilibrium for both the home and foreign firms.  Moreover, because we assume that 
* (, ) z z Γ  
is decreasing in both variables (i.e. because we rule out multiple equilibria), this is the only equilibrium 
outcome.   In case b), a measure  ˆ z of home country firms follow LCP, while all foreign firms follow 
LCP.  Note that  ˆ z  is implicitly defined by the equality  ˆ (, 1 ) z Γ= Ω.  In case c), all home country firms 
follow PCP, whereas foreign firms all follow LCP.  In case d), all home country firms follow PCP, while 
a measure 
* ˆ z  of foreign firms follow LCP.  Finally, in case e), all firms, both home and foreign, follow 
PCP.  
  Proposition 3 implies that the exchange rate pass-through into the home economy is always less 
than or equal to that into the foreign economy.  A fall in the volatility of home money growth will either 
leave exchange rate pass-through into the home economy unchanged, or decrease it.  Conversely, 
exchange rate pass-through into the foreign country either remains unchanged, or increases. Thus, firms 
tend to set their export prices in the currency that is associated with the more stable monetary growth.  
  Which of the five categories of Proposition 3 will come about depends on parameter values, and 
the relative size of money growth variances?  As in section 3, the smaller is v, the fraction of wage 
contracts that are subject to ex-post adjustment, the more likely that firms in both countries will follow 
PCP, since marginal costs will tend to have a smaller covariance with exchange rate movements.  For a 
given  ρ , the greater is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products, θ , the more 
likely is LCP, since exchange rate variance will, ceteris paribus, be smaller.   When the variance of money  
                                                                                                                                                             
(1 )(1 ) ( 1) 0 nn ρ θ ρ −−−− > .    24 
 
growth, relative to foreign money growth, falls to zero, exchange rate pass-through into the foreign 
country becomes complete.  The reason is that reducing home money growth variance to zero tends to 
fully stabilize marginal cost for the home country.  With a positive exchange rate variance determined by 
foreign monetary instability, it is therefore always optimal for home country firms to set prices in their 
domestic currency.   For foreign firms on the other hand, the variance of the exchange rate tends to fall, 
relative to the covariance of the exchange rate and marginal cost, since more and more of exchange rate 
volatility is driven by their own monetary shocks; the same shocks that are driving marginal costs.  
Now take a particular example of the impact of changes in the variance of monetary growth and 
focus on it more closely.   
Proposition 4.  
Begin in an initial symmetric equilibrium  {,} z z µ =   , where  (,) ( 1 /) z zr σ Γ= +  , with 01 z <<  .  Then 
a fall in the variance of home country monetary growth will reduce pass-through into the home country, 
and increase pass-through into the foreign country.  The new equilibrium will be either a)  {' , 1 } z µ = , b) 
{0,1} µ = , or c) 
* {0, '} z µ = , where  ' z z < , and 
* ' z z >  .   
Proof: Using the same arguments as Proposition 3, it is easy to show that the impact of the fall in the 
variance of home country monetary growth must lead to one of cases b), c) or d) of Proposition 3.   In 
particular, given that the function 
* (, ) z z Γ  is common to both countries, the impact of a fall in monetary 
growth in the home country is either to fully eliminate exchange rate pass-through into the domestic 
economy, or to increase pass-through to 100 percent in the foreign economy.  With differences in 
monetary growth variance, it is no longer possible to have partial pass-through in both economies.   
  These results provide a theoretical rationale for the conjecture that low and stable inflation rates 
may lead to a reduction in the pass-through from exchange rate movements into the CPI.  In our model, a 
fall in one country’s monetary instability will reduce exchange rate pass-through into that country, and 
hence stabilize its price level from the effects of exchange rate movements.  But the rate of pass-through 
depends on relative variances of monetary growth rates, not on the absolute variances.  Thus, pass- 25 
 
through is unaffected by a parallel reduction in monetary growth instability in both countries. Moreover, a 
decline in pass-through in one economy as a result of stable monetary policy is synonymous with a rise in 
pass-through in its partner economies.   
The model suggests an intriguing link between inflation targeting and price stability. In an 
inflation targeting country, price stability might be pursued by following a policy of low and stable 
domestic-goods inflation.    If the country's inflation targeting policy leads to a stabilization of its money 
growth rate, it encourages foreign exporters to set prices in terms of its currency.  In doing so, it stabilizes 
the imported goods component of its CPI, thereby enhancing price stability.  But the flip side of this is 
that the policy also encourages domestic exporters to favor the home currency for price-setting of goods 
to be sold in foreign markets.  As a result the foreign price level becomes more unstable.  In this respect, 
there is a type of ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ feature in the determination of exchange rate pass-through, and 
more generally in the effect of monetary policy on price stability in an open economy with endogenous 
pass-through. 
Figure 2 and 3 illustrate the results with the more general model, without the assumption of 
linearity in labor supply in the utility function. Since the Φ  and Φ * functions are no longer linearly 
dependent (in z and z*), it is now possible that there are simultaneous interior equilibrium values for pass-
through in both countries.  The parameter values used are reported in Table 4, and are mostly quite 
standard.  
Figure 2, shows the impact of a decline in the volatility of monetary growth in the home country, 
starting from the point of equal money growth volatility.  Normalizing so that the initial variances are 
unity, the horizontal axis measures
2 (1 ) u σ − , or the percentage fall in home country monetary variance.  
In this example, we assume that 75 percent of wage contracts are adjusted ex post. At the initial point, 
z=z*=0.47, so there is pass-through equal to 53 percent.  As 
2
u σ  falls however, z falls sharply, and z* 
increases, so that pass-through into the foreign economy increases to 100 percent when 
2




* u σ , and pass-through into the home economy falls to zero when 
2
u σ  falls 50 percent 
below 
2
* u σ .  
Figure 3 illustrates the case where only 50 percent of wage contracts are adjusted ex post (v=0.5). 
In this case, the initial symmetric equilibrium is one where both firms follow PCP.  But as 
2 (1 ) u σ −  rises 
to .55, foreign firms switch quite quickly to LCP, and z* rises to unity.  Pass-through into the home 
economy falls to zero.   This example points quite dramatically to the importance of relative volatility of 
money growth in determining exchange rate pass-through in our environment.  The initial symmetric 
equilibrium in this example indicates a very strong preference for PCP, given that marginal cost shows 
little ex-post responsiveness to the exchange rate.  But the change in relative monetary variability 
increases the importance of marginal costs for foreign firms so much that they will switch over to pricing 
in home currency.   
 
Conclusions 
  This paper develops a general framework for analyzing the determinants of exchange rate pass-
through in an open economy macroeconomic model.  We find that the relationship between structural 
parameters and exchange rate volatility can be altered dramatically when pass-through is endogenized.  
This is an example of the Lucas critique – changes in economic policy may lead to changes in equilibrium 
decision rules.  We have given one example where changes in relative monetary stability have very strong 
implications for equilibrium exchange rate pass-through in both countries.  Our findings suggest that 
monetary policy analysis that takes the amount of pass-through as given misses one of the key channels 
through which monetary policy may work – by changing the degree of pass-through.   
More generally, we conjecture that allowing for endogenous exchange rate pass-through may 
have significant implications for the international transmission of shocks, for optimal monetary policy, 
and for the gains from international coordination of monetary policies.    27 
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Appendix A 
Proof of proposition 1 
From (1.4), profits under PCP are given as 
1 () ( )
PCP EE S Z E S Z W
λλ λ λ λ
− Π=  .  
This expression may be rewritten as 
1 ( exp(ln )exp( ln )) ( exp(ln )exp( ln )exp(ln )) EZ S EZ S W
λλ λλ λ
−  .       (A1) 
Now use the second order approximation: 
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Using the same approximation for the expression  exp(ln )exp( ln )exp(ln ) E ZS W λ , we get an 
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where  exp( ln )exp( ln )exp((1 ) ln ) E ZE S E W λλ λ Σ= −   
Taking logs, we get expected discounted profits equal to 
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Now, expected discounted profits under LCP are written as 
[] [ ]




Π=   
Using the same approximation, they may be written as 
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  .    (A4) 
Now comparing (A3), and (A4), we can immediately establish Proposition 1.  




Here we derive the results that are obtained in section 2 of the paper.  The full model is described 
by the equations of Table 1.  This gives 16 equations for the home country, plus the balance of payments 
equation.  Adding on 16 corresponding equations for the foreign country (the foreign country’s balance of 
payments equation is dropped, by Walras’ Law), we arrive at 33 equations in the 33 endogenous variables 
listed as follows:  , ,
*
ft ht C C
** * * * * ,,,, , , , ,,, ,
aa f f a a f f
tt tt t t t ttt tt CCWWW W W W LL L L
* ,,,, ht hft hft ft YYYY 
* ,, , , fht fht t t t YYS B r
** * * * ,,,,,, , , , t t ht ft ht ft hft hft fht fht P PPPPPP P P P.  
Solution technique 
To solve this system, we take a linear approximation around an initial symmetric steady state, 
where net foreign assets are zero, all prices are equal, and the exchange rate is initially unity.  The 
solution procedure is as follows.  First, we take the linear approximation around an initial steady state 
equilibrium.  We define  ˆ ln ln tt x XX =− , as a log deviation from the initial steady state.  Define 
1 ˆˆ tj tj t tj x xE x ++− + =−  as the unexpected component of the deviation from the initial steady state.  Using 
this, we may compute the conditional variance and covariance of the exchange rate and marginal costs.  
 
Then the linearized versions of the pricing equations of Table 1 are 
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Linearizing the balance of payments condition including the home and foreign demand schedules 
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Linearizing the implicit labor supply schedules for the fixed and flexible wage setters gives 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
aa
tt tt wp c l ρψ =+ +        ( B 1 3 )    
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Finally, the linearization of the Euler equation and the money market clearing conditions (using 
the fact that the nominal interest rate is constant in equilibrium) gives: 
 
  11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () tt t t t p cE p c ρρ ++ += +        ( B 1 7 )  
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** * ˆˆ ˆ tt t mp c ρ −=          ( B 2 0 )  
 
 
To get (2.1) of the text, use equations (B19) and (B20), together with (B6) and (B7), using the definition, 
1 ˆˆ tt t t x xE x − =− , noting that for all prices, this variable will be zero, given that prices are set in period t-1.  32 
 
 
To get (2.2) of the text, use the balance of payments condition (B8), substituting in the pricing equations, 
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Doing the same for the employment equations, noting that in expected terms (in the linear 
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From (B22) and (B23),  
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,     (B24) 
Combining (B21) and (B24), and updating to period t (and using the fact that  t t t B d B d E ˆ ˆ
1 1 = + − ) gives 
(2.2) of the text.   
 
Now take the balance of payments equation (B8) again, substituting in for prices, and take away date t-1 
expectations (i.e. use the definition  1 ˆˆ tt t t x xE x − =−  again), gives (2.3) of the text.   
 
To get (2.5) of the text, use equations (B17) and (B18), substitute in for the price definitions, and take 
away date t-1 expectations.   
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Table 1(a)  Optimal conditions for consumer and firm 
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Table 1 (b) Price and Wage Index 
Wage index:    ()
1
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Import Price Index:   
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Table1 (c) Market Equilibrium 
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Balance of payments:   
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Table 2 Exchange Rate Solutions: special cases 
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Table 4 Parameter Values 
θ   1.5  r   0.1 
ρ   1.25  ω   1.5 
v  0.75 / 0.5  n  0.5 
ψ   1     35 
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The effect of a reduction in home monetary variance 
Figure 3 
The effect of a reduction in home monetary variance 
(starting from a PCP equilibrium)  37 
 
Mathematical Appendix to 
“Endogenous Exchange Rate Pass-through When Nominal Prices are Set in 
Advance” 
by 
Michael B. Devereux, Charles Engel, and Peter E. Storgaard 
The model underlying Table 1 
The structure of the economy is similar to that of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).  Within 
the world economy there is a unit measure of commodities, with each commodity being 
exclusively produced and sold by a monopolistic competitive firm.  At the same time there is a 
unit measure of households, who consume, save, hold money and work.  Households act as 
monopolists in their work decisions due to the fact that production of each commodity requires 
differentiated labor inputs.  Hence there are two levels of monopoly; at the firm level and at the 
worker level. We assume that the home economy has both n firms and n households, while the 
foreign economy has 1-n firms and 1-n households.  
To formally develop the model, we use the following notation for the distribution of 
events
15.  Say that at any time t event  t ϑ is drawn from a finite number of possible events.  The 
history of all events up to and including that at time t is denoted  12 { , , ,...}
t
tt t ϑϑ ϑ ϑ −− = , which 
occurs with date zero probability equal to  ( )
t πϑ. 
Households 
Households have utility functions given as in section 2 of the text.  The overall consumption 
index for household k is  
11 11 1
( ,) ( ,) ( 1 ) ( ,)
tt t
hf Ck n C k n C k
θ
θθ θ
θθ θ θ ϑϑ ϑ
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where the indexes of consumption of home and foreign goods are given by: 
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The consumer price index is given by ()
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15 To simplify and shorten the presentation of the paper, this state-contingent notation is omitted in the text.   38 
 




− represents the home currency price of good i which is produced 




− is the foreign currency price 
of foreign good i sold in the home country.    
Households choose a pattern of consumption across the different types of goods, choose 
how much money to hold, how much to save and in what different types of assets, and set their 
wages, subject to the demand for labor they are faced with.  In terms of wage setting, households 
are of two types.  Type a, ‘wage-adjusters’ choose their wages ex-post, after the money shocks 
have been realized for the period.  Type f, ‘wage fixers’ choose wages ex-ante, before money 
shocks have been realized. We allow for full risk sharing at the domestic level, so that Type a 
and Type f wage setters can diversify away the specific risk associated with their different ex-
post wage incomes. As we see below, this will ensure that consumption of the two types is in 
constant proportion.  With a slight additional assumption, we can ensure that consumption is 
identical across types.   
To illustrate the household’s problem, we write the budget constraint for type a 
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+Π + + + + +
  (A1) 
The household consumes, accumulates money balances, purchases international bonds and state-
contingent domestic bonds (which may only be traded within the domestic economy).  Income is 
received from wage income, profit income, interest on international bonds, money held over 
from last period, transfers from the monetary authority, and state-contingent domestic bond 
payouts from other home residents. Household k sets its wage given its local monopoly (see 
below), so implicitly employment is a function of the wage, i.e.  ( , ) ( , , ( , ))
tt t Hk Hk Wk ϑϑ ϑ =  .   39 
 
Since this is a type a household, the wage is set at time t and therefore is conditioned on 
t ϑ .  For 
a household k of type f, we denote the wage as 
1 (, )
t Wkϑ
− .   
 Household  k maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint (A1). We may write the 
Euler equations governing the choice of international bonds, state contingent domestic assets, 
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=        ( A 5 )  
  Conditions (A2) and (A3) are straightforward.  Condition (A4) represents the ‘money 
demand schedule’, while condition (A5) represents the optimal wage.  In this condition, we 
assume (as is confirmed below) that the individual wage setters face a constant elasticity of 
demand for their labor, with elasticity ω .  Hence the wage that monopoly workers set is equal to 
a markup over their marginal rate of substitution between nominal consumption and leisure.  
  Given aggregate consumption defined as a solution to this problem, it is easy to use the 
standard rules of two stage budgeting to establish that the household k’s demand for home good i 
is given by 
11
1
(, ) ( )



















Likewise, the household's demands for foreign PCP and LCP goods are, respectively: 
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 For  type  f wage setters, the wage is set based on the information set 
1 t ϑ
− .  But if the wage 
setters also maximize utility subject to their expected labor demand schedule, then for type f 
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k W .        ( A 6 )  
Since all individuals of type a have identical outcomes for employment and wages, they have 
identical consumption. The same holds for all type f agents. Type a and type f residents will have 
different wages and ex post employment outcomes.  But because there is a complete market in 
state-contingent assets among home country residents, and there is additive separability in 
preferences, the consumption of type a and type f residents will be equalized up to a constant 
factor of proportionality, related to ex-ante differences in wealth, due to their differences in 
ability to set wages.  It is convenient to go slightly beyond this and to assume that consumption 
rates are equalized.  This avoids the added notation of having to account for the differences in 
type a and type f consumption in the model presentation in Table 1.  Because the consumption 
rates are in constant proportion, it makes no difference at all to the solutions using the linear 
approximations in section 3 of the paper.  From a modeling perspective, one way to ensure that 
consumption of both types is equalized is to imagine that type a and type f are drawn from a 
distribution with probability v and 1-v respectively, and that in every period, the market in state 
contingent assets for the next period must close before agents know which type they are.  This  41 
 
will ensure that they are ex ante identical in every period, and hence, with full state contingent 
assets, also ex post identical in terms of consumption.  
Firms 
Firms are owned by domestic households, and rebate all profit back to households.  Thus, they 
will use the household’s nominal state discount factor  ( )
t d ϑ in order to evaluate their profits, 
when choosing prices in period t-1 to apply for period t.  First we note that for any event 
t ϑ , a 



















  () () ,
tt MC Y i ϑϑ ≡ .  This affirms our assumption that an individual 
worker k will face a labor demand schedule for her specialist services that has a constant 
elasticity ω .   
In choosing prices in advance the firm will take into account the demand schedules of home and 
foreign consumers.  We assume that firms can perfectly price discriminate across countries.  As a 
result, it may set a separate price for home and foreign markets.  The objective function of the 
home firm choosing its price for sales in the home market will be 
 − (
− ) , ( )] ( ) , ( )[
1 t
h
t t t i C MC i P d ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ , where the demand schedule for firm i selling in the 
home market is defined in Table 1(c). The firm faces a constant elasticity of demand λ , and 






) , ( ) (











h i C d







 In a parallel manner, the firm selling to the foreign market will choose a price to maximize state 
contingent profits, and will face the demand schedules given by either  hft Y  or 
*
hft Y , depending on  42 
 
whether it follows a PCP or LCP rule for setting its price.  Again it is easy to establish that the 
optimal price is represented by the expressions in the right hand panels of Table 1(a).  To cut 
down on excessive notation, and without introducing any ambiguity, we omit the state notation 
in Table 1, and write the Euler equations and pricing equations in terms of conditional 
expectations instead. In addition, Table 1 imposes symmetry among firms in each category, and 
replaces the marginal cost expression with the domestic nominal wage, given in Table 1 (b).  
 